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1. Introduction
The notion that real-world contracts are often too “incomplete”1, and the rea-
sons, as well as the consequences, of such incompleteness, have intrigued and
fascinated economists for some time.2 When it comes to explaining contractual
incompleteness, a number of approaches have been proposed in the literature,
including those based on some form of bounded rationality, transactions costs,
and signaling. Most of these have focused on possible costs of complete contracts
arising at the ex ante stage when the contract is agreed3. This paper identifies
instead a potential cost of complete contracts arising at the ex post, execution
stage. It then explores its implications in the context of financial contracts for
innovative start-up companies, providing a rationale for the observed differences
in the extent to which venture capital contracts include a variety of contingencies,
and for how this varies across industries and geographically.
The main idea is the following. The execution of a complete contingent con-
tract typically generates hard information, which is informative about the realized
state of nature. For example, the contract may specify state-contingent trades
and/or transfers; ex post, hard evidence of the trade and/or transfer that has
actually occurred will be informative about the realized state. In a variety of cir-
cumstances, it may be in the interest of the contracting parties ex ante to commit
not to reveal this information to other parties ex post. Thus if the production of
hard information about realized contingencies can be reduced by specifying fewer
contractual contingencies, incomplete contracts may be preferred to complete con-
1Incompleteness has been defined in different ways. Ex post, it can be argued that contracts
that are renegotiated must have been “incomplete”. Ex ante, contracts are often viewed as in-
complete through a comparison with (theoretically) optimal contracts. Thus a sufficiently broad
definition of optimality (i.e. contracts that are optimal given all possibly relevant constraints,
including those due to the cognitive costs of trying to foresee future contingencies) would make
the distinction between complete and incomplete contracts largely redundant. In this paper,
I will follow most of the literature and use a less broad definition of optimality, and hence
incompleteness.
2Incomplete contracts were central to the property rights approach developed by Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), building on the insights of Williamson (1975, 1985)
and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978). Since then, they have been at the heart of numerous
theories attempting to shed light on a variety of economic outcomes.
3These include cognitive/delay costs incurred in thinking about future contingencies (see
especially Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2005, 2007), and Tirole (2008)), and the costs of writing
appropriate contracts (as in, for example, Anderlini and Felli (1994, 1999), Battigalli and Maggi
(2002), Dye (1985), Hart and Moore (1999), and Segal (1999)).
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tracts, even when the latter would be more efficient in reducing agency costs, or
hold-up problems, in the relationship between the two contracting parties.
There are two natural potential objections to this line of argument. First, sup-
pose that an incomplete contract is agreed between A and B, which will benefit
one of the two, say B, ex post, by not revealing information about the realized
state of nature to a third party C. Suppose however that A can, privately and
independently, generate hard evidence about the realized state of nature, and sell
it to C ex post. This may, in some cases, "undo" the benefits of an incomplete
contract. In very many cases, though, each individual contracting party will have
some scope for discretion and manipulation in the production of hard evidence
(e.g. omitting some "unfavorable" detail; engaging in some form of "window-
dressing")4. This will undermine the credibility of such evidence in the eyes of
third parties. In contrast, if A and B sign a complete contingent contract speci-
fying, say, a (unique) transfer t(γ) to be paid by B to A in state γ, then evidence
of the transfer actually paid ex post is credible evidence about γ, since it requires
agreement between the two informed parties5. It is this difference in credibility
that gives an advantage to incomplete contracts.
The second natural potential objection to the main argument in this paper is
that the trade-off I identify between complete and incomplete contracts will not
arise if the parties can commit to secret execution of complete contracts. In prac-
tice, confidentiality clauses are often included in contracts, and courts are typically
willing to enforce them6. Does this solve the problem? In the circumstances I con-
sider, it does not. The reason is that court enforcement of confidentiality clauses
requires legally acceptable proof to be produced when the contract is breached.
However, as will become clearer below, when information can be credibly trans-
mitted simply by showing, privately, evidence to another party, without handing
it over, it becomes very difficult to prove that breach occurred, hampering at-
tempts to enforce confidentiality clauses. Thus in a variety of circumstances, the
fact that hard information has been generated by execution of a complete con-
tract may enable outside parties to extract the information at no cost (in the
spirit of Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980) and Milgrom (1981)), even
4See Tirole (2006), pp.299-300, for a discussion and examples of firms’ earnings manipulations
and balance-sheet window dressing.
5Thus any attempt by A to manipulate the evidence in his favor would be challenged by B.
The one caveat is the case where the ex post gains that B could make by inducing C to believe
the true state is γ exceed the cost of paying the transfer t(γ) even when the true state is not γ.
I rule out this less interesting case to focus on the key trade-offs at the heart of the paper.
6See Daughety and Reinganum (2005).
3
in the presence of confidentiality clauses. Complete contracts with confidential-
ity clauses will not, in this case, provide a more efficient solution to the parties’
original contracting problem, and the trade-off identified above between complete
and incomplete contracts will continue to apply.
To fix ideas, consider the following example. Suppose a capital-constrained
entrepreneur with a novel idea (project) obtains funding from a venture capitalist
to enter a new industry; call them "the incumbent" and "investor 1", respectively.
Turning the idea into commercial success requires entrepreneurial effort. Assume
that, following the incumbent’s effort choice but before realization of the project’s
returns, an intermediate performance signal γ is realized, observable only by the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. At this stage, another entrepreneur ("the
entrant") seeks funding for a rival project, whose expected profitability depends on
how successful the incumbent has been in building up a competitive advantage.
Let the intermediate performance signal be informative about the incumbent’s
effort and also about the potential entrant’s expected profitability. In this case,
leaving aside entry considerations, the efficient complete contract between the
incumbent and investor 1 may entail a reward for the incumbent contingent on
a good performance signal. However, execution of the contract may reveal to
other parties the realization of the signal, and hence also information about the
potential entrant’s expected profitability.
Intuitively, in some circumstances it may be advantageous for the original
contracting parties (incumbent and investor 1) to commit not to reveal the real-
ization of the signal to other interested parties (potential entrant, other possible
investors), by choosing an incomplete contract that is not contingent on the sig-
nal. As I will show, this can generate informational rents for the contracting
parties that may be greater than any losses associated with less efficient effort
incentives. Moreover, as suggested earlier, secretly-executed complete contracts
would not improve on such incomplete contracts: this is because the execution
of a complete contract, even when it is not observable by others, generates hard
information available to the contracting parties (in our example, transfers and
receipts). Other parties may then be able to view such evidence, secretly, or to
make appropriate inferences if denied viewing.
Delaying execution of complete contracts (in our example, waiting until the
project’s returns are realized and only then establishing the realized value of the
intermediate signal, and any reward that might be due) would avoid generating
hard information at the intermediate stage. This might help in some circum-
stances, but in general it will be problematic, not least because, as noted earlier,
4
the process of determining reliably the realized state depends crucially on the abil-
ity of each contracting party to challenge possible omissions and manipulations of
the evidence by the other party. To challenge successfully often requires obtain-
ing and presenting relevant additional evidence, which will be much more difficult
after a long delay, as circumstances change, and past information is forgotten by
potential witnesses7.
The key trade-off remains therefore the one between complete and incomplete
contracts identified earlier. To explore these ideas, and study their implications
for venture capital and innovation, I develop in section 2 a model of sequential
entry into a new industry by innovative, capital-constrained entrepreneurs, of the
kind often financed by venture capitalists (see Sahlman and Stevenson (1985)
for a detailed account of such venture-funded sequential entry in the disk-drive
industry). I examine two cases, corresponding to different assumptions about
the nature of competition among venture capitalists. To begin with, I study the
case of imperfect competition. In particular, in line with the evidence on venture
capital discussed below, I assume that there are a number of venture capitalists
who behave cooperatively, thereby earning an expected rate of return equal to
1 + α; i.e. they do not undercut each other (but do compete if one of them is
observed deviating by trying to obtain an expected rate of return greater than
1 +α). As will become clear, in the setting under consideration this is equivalent
to assuming that there is a single investor, and that entrepreneurs have all the
bargaining power in negotiating with this investor, subject to guaranteeing him an
expected rate of return equal to 1+α. On the other hand, the fact that this is not
a monopoly investor means that there is nothing to be gained by using exclusive
contracts with liquidated damages as in Aghion and Bolton (1987), or equivalently,
sophisticated contracts contingent on subsequent entry8. A trade-off between
complete and incomplete contracts emerges in this case when the potential entrant
is of sufficiently high quality, because the investor can then obtain informational
rents from the entrant if the latter is uninformed about the realization of γ. The
expected value of these rents has to be set against two potential costs. First, the
incomplete contract requires that the entrepreneur’s reward be more sensitive to
7The problem of witnesses forgetting information is well-known: this has been shown to
happen over periods as short as five months (see, for example, Flin et al. (1992)). As for
documentary evidence, the legal literature makes clear the importance of obtaining this at the
time when the relevant "state of nature" is realized (see, for example, Rosenstock (2007), pp.
530-531). See also footnote 11.
8I discuss this point in more detail on page 15.
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final returns, implying that the entrepreneur’s loss from entry (for which, unlike
the investor, he is not compensated) will be greater. Second, there is the cost of
providing effort incentives less efficiently. Interestingly though, in some cases this
second cost may be more than offset by the beneficial impact on effort incentives
due to the fact that informational rents help to relax the investor’s participation
constraint.
I then investigate how the results are affected when we assume a much more
competitive environment among venture capitalists. Specifically, I consider the
polar case of perfect competition, in which investors behave competitively and
entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power. I find that a trade-off between com-
plete and incomplete contracts can emerge in this case too, albeit of a different
nature. When potential entrants are of intermediate quality, investor 1’s informa-
tional advantage under incomplete contracting9 enables him to reduce the losses
associated with entry. This advantage has to be set against the cost of providing
effort incentives less efficiently - with no offsetting benefit due to informational
rents though. Indeed, if potential informational rents are sufficiently important,
the benefits of incomplete contracts will be greater in the presence of imperfectly
competitive, cooperative venture capitalists than in the presence of perfectly com-
petitive investors.
In line with the intuition discussed earlier, allowing for the possibility of
secretly-executed complete contracts does not undermine the basic trade-offs just
described. Executing such contracts would generate hard information about trans-
fers, available to each of the contracting parties. In the imperfectly competitive
case, this would enable the entrant to extract the information from the investor
and use it to reduce his informational rents to zero. With perfectly competitive
investors, on the other hand, the information could be obtained from the incum-
bent at the expense of investor 1. In both cases, the incumbent and his financier
do not gain ex ante from choosing a complete contract with a commitment to
secret execution.
The trade-off I obtain between complete and incomplete contracts is consis-
tent with evidence on venture capital contracts analyzed by Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003). In their sample, approximately 37% of contracts provided some form of
reward for the entrepreneur contingent on intermediate performance signals10, as
9Being the one who funds the incumbent, investor 1 is the only one able to observe the
realization of γ.
10Rewards included giving equity, options or additional funding to the entrepreneur, or sus-
pending dividend payments to venture capitalists.
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in our complete contracts. The remainder did not, as in our incomplete contracts.
The performance measures used included financial targets, based on revenues and
operating profits, and product targets, such as reaching a threshold number of
customers who have purchased the product and given positive feedback, acquir-
ing a technology, or developing a facility. As assumed in our model, it seems
likely that in the event of disagreement between the entrepreneur and the venture
capitalist, the "honest" party could have successfully challenged the other’s (dis-
honest) claim; for example, the venture capitalist could have challenged "creative
accounting", as well as "embellished" claims of customer satisfaction, technol-
ogy acquisition or facility development11. The evidence analyzed by Kaplan and
Strömberg therefore seems relevant to our model, and the fact that a significant
proportion of contracts in their sample included rewards based on intermediate
performance signals, while the majority did not, is consistent with an underlying
cost-benefit trade-off of the kind explored in this paper.
One important implication of my analysis is that the nature of the trade-off
between complete and incomplete contracts will be sensitive to the degree of com-
petition among investors12. The venture capital industry is often viewed as being
characterized by imperfect competition, owing to the specialized knowledge re-
quired to evaluate, monitor and advise innovative entrepreneurial start-ups13. The
evidence on venture capitalists’ behavior is consistent with this view: they often
lend in syndicates, which encourages cooperative behavior through the prospect
of repeated interaction, and do not compete strongly in “cold” periods14. Indeed,
"There is a great deal of cronyism among venture capital firms",15 and "if two
venture capitalists are approached by an entrepreneur, they will likely participate
11These examples illustrate the potential difficulties associated with delaying contractual exe-
cution. For instance, it is much easier to prove today that a facility or technology has not been
adequately developed, than to do so retrospectively in a few years’ time, when development
may have progressed substantially. Moreover, it would be very costly for each of the contracting
parties to obtain privately all the evidence that could potentially be useful in the event of a
dispute at the enforcement stage later on.
12In this respect, my paper is related to Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1995), albeit very
different: in their work, the nature of competition affects contractual choices through its impact
on the payoffs from precommitment. There is no trade-off between complete and incomplete
contracts.
13See Gompers and Lerner (1999), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004), Gorman and Sahlman
(1989), and Sahlman (1990).
14See Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).
15Bygrave and Timmons (1992), citing sociologist Everett Rogers.
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in a syndicate rather than compete away fees by undercutting".16 In such circum-
stances, my results suggest that incomplete contracts are more likely to emerge
when the expected value of the informational rents that can be extracted from
new entrants is higher, implying that the incumbent’s intermediate performance
can be very good (high γ) or very poor (low γ). To my knowledge, this implication
has not been tested directly so far. However, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003, 2004)
do find that incomplete venture capital contracts are more common for firms in
industries with a high R&D/sales ratio. Their finding seems consistent with this
paper’s analysis, since highly innovative projects tend to be more risky (γ can
be very high or very low), and the expected profitability of new entrants in high
R&D industries is likely to be particularly sensitive to the progress made (or not)
by the incumbent.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) also find that venture capital contracts tend to
be more incomplete in California. This "California effect" is confirmed by Bengts-
son and Ravid (2009) with a larger dataset. The finding is interesting in the light
of our model because of the importance of networks in the venture capital indus-
try, and the fact that the top firms in the high-tech venture capital network are
located in California (Bygrave and Timmons (1992)). We would therefore expect
the California venture capital industry to be particularly close to the coopera-
tive, imperfectly competitive case analyzed in this paper. The widespread use of
incomplete contracts in California would then be predicted by our model in the
presence of significant rents for venture capitalists, notably from high quality en-
trants. Highly suggestive evidence in support of this prediction has been provided
in recent work by Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2009). They compare valuations
of venture-funded companies in different venture capital markets, and find that
valuations are significantly lower, after controlling for other value drivers, in more
densely networked venture capital markets, such as Silicon Valley.
The paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this section discusses
the relationship with the existing literature. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 briefly presents the benchmark case where entry is ruled out exogenously.
Subsequent sections develop the analysis allowing for the possibility of entry:
section 4 examines the case of imperfect competition, while section 5 studies the
implications of perfect competition between investors. Section 6 concludes.
16Anand and Galetovic (2000).
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1.1. Relationship to the literature
This paper is related to several important literatures. First, obviously, the large
literature on incomplete contracts. Here the closest links are with contributions
that have explored strategic and informational explanations for contractual in-
completeness. Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that when contracts cannot
condition on some aspects of performance, because they are not verifiable, they
may optimally leave other, verifiable, aspects unspecified, generating strategic
ambiguity. The key to their results is the effect that explicit contractual provi-
sions have on the set of feasible self-enforcing implicit agreements between the
parties. The present paper is also concerned with strategic incompleteness, but
for a very different reason: incompleteness makes contractual execution less in-
formative, and through this channel affects subsequent strategic interactions with
other parties.17 Other papers that have explored the informational implications
of incomplete contracts have tended to focus on the informational content of a
contractual offer, as in Allen and Gale (1992) and Spier (1992).18 Allen and Gale
consider an environment in which different agents have different abilities to ma-
nipulate information about contingencies. Non-contingent contracts emerge in
equilibrium because they do not create incentives to engage in such manipulation.
Spier shows how, in the presence of (exogenous) transactions costs, an informed
principal may prefer an incomplete contract to signal that his "type" is "good".
My paper is, to my knowledge, the first to focus instead on the (hard) information
generated by contractual execution, and the ways in which outside parties, as well
as the contracting parties, may use strategically this information.
Second, my work builds on the insights from the "unraveling result" of Gross-
man (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980) and Milgrom (1981), leading to full dis-
closure of hard information. This result applies in my model since hard evidence
is generated by the execution of complete contracts. Moreover, this hard evidence
can be transmitted privately (secretly) to another party by simply being shown
to that party: in this respect, it acts essentially as an "eye-opener", rather like
the enunciation of information in Tirole (2008). At the same time, this effectively
rules out reliance on private "contracts of silence", as in Daughety and Reinganum
(2005), since breach of contract would be very difficult to prove in court.
17Ellison (2005) and Martimort and Piccolo (2007) also study the potential strategic benefits
of incomplete contracts, again due to very different reasons: in both papers, incompleteness
helps to "soften" competition.
18See also Aghion and Hermalin (1990), who study the desirability of legal restrictions on
contracting to prevent inefficient signaling.
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Another important related literature is the one on entry prevention. Here the
closest links are with Aghion and Bolton (1987), and Cestone and White (2003).
Aghion and Bolton analyze a setting where a buyer and a seller negotiate a con-
tract under a threat of entry by another seller. They show that an exclusive
contract with appropriately designed liquidated damages can be used optimally
to extract some of the entrant’s surplus: the damages act as an entry fee. In the
present paper, such an exclusive contract between the incumbent and investor 1
would not have the same effect because of the presence of other investors. Nev-
ertheless, the insight of Aghion and Bolton can be extended to our setting in
the following sense: in the presence of imperfectly competitive investors, infor-
mational rents may act as an endogenous entry fee, making it possible to extract
some surplus from the entrant.
Cestone and White study instead how entry can be deterred through financial
contracts. They find that imperfect competition (monopoly) in financial markets
can lead to entry deterrence in product markets, which vanishes as financial mar-
kets approach perfect competition. In the present paper this need not be the case:
imperfect competition in financial markets can lead to entry accommodation (and
surplus extraction) when incomplete contracts are chosen, while perfectly com-
petitive investors may use incomplete contracts to achieve entry deterrence. The
difference with Cestone and White arises because they examine a very different
model, where there is no intermediate performance signal for the incumbent, and
hence no trade-off between complete and incomplete contracts. My work therefore
highlights the importance of taking into account the nature of contracts used in
examining the link between financial and product market competition.
Finally, my paper builds on the insights of the literature on financial interme-
diaries and their ex post informational advantage, starting with the key contribu-
tions by Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990).19 A key difference is that this literature
has studied primarily financial contracts between a single borrower (entrepreneur)
and his lender(s), whereas potential competitors (entrants) play a crucial role in
my model.
2. The model
The model has two periods and three dates, t = 0, 1, 2. At the beginning of
the first period (t = 0), an entrepreneur may enter a new industry and invest
19See also Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2006), Dessí (2005),
Garmaise (2006), Inderst and Mueller (2006), Schmidt (2003) and Von Thadden (2004).
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in a project, call it project F (F for “first”). At the end of the first period
(t = 1), the state γ is realized (see below). At this stage another entrepreneur
may enter the industry and invest in a competing project, call it project E (E for
“entrant”). The probability of success of project F at the end of the second period
(t = 2) will depend on the state γ and on whether entry occurs. The state γ will
also affect the probability of success of the competing project E. Entrepreneurs
possess no capital and need to raise finance from investors (venture capitalists).
For simplicity, there is no discounting. All agents in the model are assumed to be
risk neutral and protected by limited liability.
2.1. The incumbent
Project F requires an initial outlay of value KF . The first entrepreneur (hence-
forth also called the incumbent) faces considerable uncertainty about his project’s
returns when he invests at t = 0: some of the uncertainty is resolved at t = 1,
when the state γ is realized. For simplicity, γ is assumed to take one of two values:
γG (“good” state) or γB (“bad” state), with γG > γB > 0. If there is no entry,
project F yields verifiable returns RH at t = 2 with probability γ, and RL other-
wise, where RH > KF > RL > 0. Thus γ represents the probability of “success”
(high returns) in the second period in the absence of competition. The impact of
competition is considered below.
If project F is undertaken at t = 0, the incumbent chooses his effort level
e ∈ (0, eH), where 0 < eH < 1. The cost of effort is given by c(e) ≡
1
2
e2.
Entrepreneurial effort increases the probability of the good state: specifically, the
good state occurs with probability e. I shall make the following assumption:
γBR
H + (1− γB)RL < KF (A1) (2.1)
implying that, leaving aside entry considerations, the project is not worth
undertaking with zero effort. In what follows, I denote by ∆γ = γG− γB > 0 the
difference in the probability of success between the good state and the bad state.
2.2. The entrant
At t = 1, a second entrepreneur (henceforth also called the entrant or rival) may
enter the industry and invest in a competing project. This project requires an
initial outlay of value KE. It succeeds with probability ρ, which is defined as
11
follows20:
ρ ≡ θ
γ
(2.2)
Here θ represents the quality of the entrant, and may take any value between
θL and θH (where θH > θL > 0). For simplicity, I will assume that θ is known
when the incumbent contracts to obtain funding for his project at t = 0. This is
in fact plausible in high-technology sectors, where competitors are mostly drawn
from a pool of potential entrants of known quality; e.g. other actual or potential
entrepreneurs working on related projects, or on a similar project but at a less
advanced stage. The specification in (2.2) captures in a simple way the idea
that the entrant’s probability of success is reduced when the incumbent has been
very successful in the first period (for example, in developing and testing new
products and processes, forming valuable strategic alliances, developing ties with
suppliers and customers, and building up a reputation that gives him a competitive
advantage): ρ therefore decreases with γ.
If the project succeeds, it yields verifiable returns Y H ; if it fails, it yields Y L
(Y H > KE > Y L > 0). If the entrepreneur decides to enter, he obviously has an
impact on the profitability of the incumbent. I model this by assuming that entry
reduces the incumbent’s success probability to γ − μ, where γB > μ > 0.
2.3. Investors
Entrepreneurs seek financing from investors such as venture capitalists, who pos-
sess enough expertise and sector-specific knowledge to be able to evaluate entre-
preneurs. Section 4 focuses on the case of imperfectly competitive, cooperative
venture capitalists. Perfect competition between investors is examined in section
5. The investors’ cost of funds is normalized to one. Investors require an expected
rate of return on their capital contributions equal to 1 + α, where α > 0 implies
that they earn some rents (α = 0 under perfect competition). The investor who
finances the incumbent will be denoted as "investor 1", or simply "the investor",
throughout the paper. For expositional convenience, define IF ≡ KF (1 + α) and
IE ≡ KE(1 + α).
20For simplicity I do not allow the entrant’s probability of success to depend also on his effort.
The main qualitative insights of the analysis would continue to hold in this case.
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2.4. Information
I assume that γ is only observed by the incumbent and investor 1 at t = 1. The
notion that firm "insiders" possess an informational advantage concerning the
firm’s progress and prospects seems a very reasonable assumption in the context
of young, entrepreneurial firms (see, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1994),
Dessí (2005) and Schmidt (2003)). On the other hand, as discussed in the Intro-
duction, γ is contractable, in the following sense. In the event of a legal dispute
at t = 1 between the incumbent and his investor, the courts would be able to
establish who was telling the truth concerning the realization of γ, by examining
the information provided by the two informed parties and obtaining additional
evidence where necessary.
By assuming that γ is contractable, and that it is a sufficient statistic for effort,
I am deliberately stacking up the odds in favour of "complete contracts", meaning
contracts contingent on γ. This will help to isolate clearly the possible strategic
benefits of incomplete contracts.
2.5. Time line
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Project F Realization of γ. Project
undertaken? Entry? returns
Incumbent realized.
chooses effort.
3. No entry
This section presents the benchmark case where entry is ruled out a priori : opti-
mal financial contracts for this case will provide a useful benchmark for compari-
son. In subsequent sections, I shall allow for the possibility of entry.
Suppose that no entry can occur at t = 1. In this case the only financial
contract to be examined is the one agreed at t = 0 between the incumbent and
investor 1. For expositional convenience, I shall refer to investor 1 simply as “the
investor” in what follows. To make this benchmark case as general as possible
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(for later comparisons), I assume that the investor requires an expected rate of
return equal to 1 + α (α > 0) on his capital contribution.
Given that γ is a sufficient statistic for effort, the most efficient way to elicit
effort from the entrepreneur is to offer him a reward, Re > 0, contingent on the
realization of the "good" state at t = 1 (i.e., when γ = γG), and zero otherwise
(because of limited liability). The investor provides the initial capital KF at t = 0
and receives the project’s returns at t = 2. The entrepreneur’s contractual offer
to the investor at t = 0, denoted by C1, solves the following problem, P1:
Max eRe −
1
2
e2 (3.1)
e = Re (IC) (3.2)
e[γGR
H + (1− γG)RL] + (1− e)[γBRH + (1− γB)RL]− eRe > IF (IR) (3.3)
where (IC) is the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint and (IR) the investor’s
participation constraint (using the notation of section 2, i.e. IF ≡ KF (1 + α)). It
can be easily checked that the first-best effort level, which maximizes the project’s
expected returns net of effort costs, is given by eFB1 ≡ ∆γ(RH−RL). To implement
this would require setting Re = ∆γ(RH − RL) (from (IC)). This would imply
that the maximum income that could be pledged to the investor would be equal
to RL + γB(RH − RL). By assumption (A1), this will not be sufficient to satisfy
(IR). Thus effort eN will be determined by the binding (IR) constraint as follows:
(eN∆γ + γB)(R
H −RL) +RL − (eN)2 = IF (3.4)
and will be lower than the first-best level.
4. Entry: imperfectly competitive investors
I now allow for the possibility of entry at t = 1. In this section, I focus on the
case of imperfectly competitive, cooperative investors, which seems particularly
relevant to venture capitalists, as discussed in the Introduction. I assume that
by cooperating, these investors may be able to earn some rents; i.e. α > 0.
Investors who are observed deviating by trying to earn even higher rents will
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trigger competitive behavior by the others; otherwise, investors do not undercut
each other, nor try to profit by inflicting losses on another.
I begin by analyzing the case where the incumbent and investor 1 at t = 0
sign a contract contingent on the realization of γ, and execution of the contract
at t = 1 reveals γ to outside parties ("complete contracts"). I will then study
the case where the contract is not contingent on the realization of γ, so as to
avoid revealing information to outside parties ("incomplete contracts"). The end
of the section will examine what can be achieved with secretly-executed complete
contracts.
Given our assumptions we can, without loss of generality, focus attention on
non-exclusive contracts, as will become clear below. In particular, the incumbent
could not extract additional surplus from the entrant, relative to the contracts
examined in the remainder of this section, by offering investor 1 an exclusive
contract with liquidated damages (as in Aghion and Bolton (1987)). The reason
is that in the presence of sufficiently high damages intended to extract such a
surplus, the entrant would be able to obtain funding from other investors. The
same reason rules out any gains from using more sophisticated contracts between
the incumbent and investor 1, contingent on subsequent entry.21
The financial contracts that will emerge optimally in the presence of imper-
fectly competitive, cooperative investors are equivalent to those that would be
agreed between entrepreneurs and a monopoly investor if the entrepreneurs had
all the bargaining power, subject to guaranteeing the investor an expected rate of
return equal to 1 + α. For ease of exposition, therefore, I shall analyze the latter
case, and refer to investor 1 simply as "the investor" in what follows.
The timing of the game is the following. The incumbent offers a contract to
the investor at t = 0. The investor accepts or rejects. If he accepts, project F is
undertaken, and the entrepreneur chooses his effort level. At t = 1, the state γ is
realized and is observed by the incumbent and the investor. A second entrepreneur
seeks financing for a competing project, project E. He makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the investor. The investor decides whether to accept or reject the rival’s
offer. If he accepts, project E is undertaken. Both projects’ returns are realized
at t = 2.
21For example, contracts in which investor 1 is required to only accept the entrant’s offer if it
yields a sufficiently high return. This is essentially equivalent to the Aghion and Bolton scheme,
and again would trigger a competitive response by other investors in our setting.
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4.1. Complete contracts
The optimal complete contract agreed at t = 0 between the incumbent and the
investor takes the form studied above for the no-entry case: the entrepreneur
receives a rewardRe if, and only if, γ = γG, while the investor receives the project’s
final returns. This type of contract is optimal because it elicits effort efficiently
from the incumbent, and at the same time makes the investor the residual claimant
at t = 1. The investor therefore fully internalizes the costs of entry for project F
when he decides whether to fund project E. Given this form of contract between
the incumbent and the investor, the game between the entrant and the investor
at t = 1 is also very simple.
4.1.1. The entrant’s offer
The second entrepreneur learns the value of γ at t = 1, when the incumbent is
rewarded (or not). He can therefore condition his take-it-or-leave-it offer to the in-
vestor on γ. To characterize this offer, note first of all that the investor’s expected
loss on project F if he finances project E is given by LC ≡ μ(RH − RL). The
rival entrepreneur can only obtain funding for his project if he can pledge enough
income to the investor to compensate for this loss, as well as guaranteeing him
the required expected rate of return on the initial outlay KE. The circumstances
in which entry will occur are therefore described by the following result.
Lemma 1. (i) Entry always occurs when θ > θG, where θG is defined by:
θG ≡
γG
Y H − Y L (IE + L
C − Y L) (4.1)
(ii) Entry occurs if, and only if, γ = γB, when θ is in the range θE 6 θ < θG,
where θE is equal to:
θE ≡
γB
Y H − Y L (IE + L
C − Y L) (4.2)
(iii) When θ < θE, the rival entrepreneur cannot enter.
Proof : see Appendix.
Thus for high values of θ, the rival’s pledgeable income will be sufficient for
him to secure funding irrespective of the realization of γ. For intermediate values
of θ, on the other hand, the rival will only be able to obtain financing when
the incumbent has not been successful in the first period, which makes entry
profitable. Finally, entry will never occur for sufficiently low values of θ. When
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entry is feasible, the entrant offers a contract that maximizes his expected utility
subject to the constraint that the investor be willing to fund the project, given
the value of γ. Formally, denote by CMR = {Y HI , Y HR , Y LI , Y LR } the entrant’s
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor at t = 1, where Y JM (M = I,R) denotes
M ’s payoff at t = 2 if project E yields returns Y J (J = H,L). Here I denotes the
investor and R the entrant. For a given realization of γ, the entrepreneur solves
the following problem, P2:
Max (
θ
γ
)Y HR + (1−
θ
γ
)Y LR (4.3)
(
θ
γ
)Y HI + (1−
θ
γ
)Y LI − μ(RH −RL) > IE (IR) (4.4)
Y HI + Y
H
R = Y
H (4.5)
Y LI + Y
L
R = Y
L (4.6)
Y HI > 0, Y HR > 0, Y LI > 0, Y LR > 0 (LL) (4.7)
The investor’s participation constraint is given by (IR); we then have the
feasibility and limited liability constraints. Clearly the investor’s participation
constraint will hold as an equality. The solution to P2 will therefore be a contract
that just compensates the investor for his expected loss on project F while yielding
the required expected rate of return, 1 + α, on his capital contribution to project
E (KE)22.
4.1.2. The incumbent’s offer
Given that the investor will earn no informational rents in his interaction with
the entrant, while fully internalizing the costs of entry for project F (implying
22Clearly for θ > θG, the investor would like, if he could, to induce the entrant to believe
that γ = γG when in fact γ = γB, since this would enable him to earn some informational
rents - denote these by QN . To the extent that the entrant’s beliefs about γ are determined by
observing whether the incumbent is rewarded or not, this would generate incentives for strategic
manipulation of rewards if Re < QN . In order to isolate the potential benefits of incomplete
contracts even in the absence of such considerations, I will focus on the more interesting case
where Re > QN .
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that he will fund the rival if, and only if, he is compensated for these costs), the
incumbent’s offer will be the same as in the no-entry case analyzed in section 3,
denoted by C1. The incumbent’s expected payoff from this contract is simply the
NPV of project F , given effort eN , which is equal to:
NPV = eN∆γ(RH −RL)− 1
2
(eN)2 +RL + γB(R
H −RL)− IF (4.8)
4.2. Incomplete contracts
We now examine what happens if the incumbent and the investor at t = 0 agree
a contract that is not contingent on γ. In this case, the entrant will not be able
to learn the realization of γ at t = 1. As we shall see below, this may entail some
benefits for the incumbent. However, there is also a potential cost, to the extent
that effort incentives cannot be provided as efficiently as when the entrepreneur’s
reward is contingent on γ. Moreover, the incumbent will incur a loss when entry
occurs. To study the interplay of these effects and their implications, note first
of all that the contract between the incumbent and the investor now can only
condition on the realization of final project returns. It will therefore take the
general form CMI = {RHI , RHE , RLI , RLE}, where RJM denotes the payoff for M
(M = I,E) at t = 2 when realized returns are equal to RJ (J = H,L). I denotes
the investor, as before, and E the entrepreneur (incumbent).
The timing of the game is the same as in the case of complete contracts studied
above; the difference is in the information structure. In particular, the entrant
will make his offer to the investor without knowing the realized value of γ.
4.2.1. The entrant’s offer
The game is solved by backward induction. We begin with the second entrepre-
neur’s take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor at t = 1. As before, there will be a
threshold value of θ, call it θIE, such that for all θ < θ
I
E, project E would not yield
enough pledgeable income to induce the investor to provide the required capital
KE (taking into account his expected loss on project F if he decides to fund the
rival project E), even when γ = γB. Clearly this threshold value will depend on
the contract agreed at t = 0 between the investor and the incumbent, which will
be derived below: the terms of this contract determine the investor’s expected
loss on project F if he decides to fund project E, denoted by L ≡ μ(RHI − RLI ).
Similarly, there will be a second threshold value, θIG, such that for all θ < θ
I
G,
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the income that can be pledged to the investor will be insufficient to induce the
investor to fund project E when γ = γG.
For a given contract CMI, the threshold values are given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. There is a threshold value θIE such that for all θ < θ
I
E, the investor
will not be willing to fund project E at t = 1, irrespective of the realization of γ.
This threshold value is equal to:
θIE ≡
γB
Y H − Y L (IE + L− Y
L) (4.9)
There is a second threshold value θIG such that for all θ < θ
I
G, the investor will
not be willing to fund project E when γ = γG. This threshold value is equal to:
θIG ≡
γG
Y H − Y L (IE + L− Y
L) (4.10)
Proof : follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
The two thresholds, θIE and θ
I
G, are both increasing in L, the magnitude of the
investor’s expected loss on project F when he funds project E.
We can now characterize the second entrepreneur’s take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the investor at t = 1, given the terms of the existing contract between the investor
and the incumbent. We begin by deriving the optimal contract when θ is in the
range θIE 6 θ < θIG; we shall then derive the optimal contract for θ > θIG.
In the range θIE 6 θ < θIG, the entrant knows that he can only induce the
investor to fund his project if the incumbent has not been successful in the first
period; i.e. if γ = γB. He therefore offers a contract that maximizes his expected
utility subject to the constraint that the investor be willing to fund the project
when γ = γB. This contract is obtained by solving problem P2 (equations (4.3)
to (4.7)), for γ = γB. For ease of exposition, define Z ≡ IE + L. The solution is
then described by the following result.
Proposition 1. Assume θIE 6 θ < θIG. The rival’s take-it-or-leave-it offer
to the investor, CMRI , has the following properties: (a) the investor is just
compensated for his expected loss on project F when γ = γB, and earns no
informational rents; (b) the investor will accept the offer when γ = γB, and reject
it otherwise; (c) the rival’s expected utility when the offer is accepted is equal to:
US =
θ
γB
(Y H − Y L) + Y L − Z (4.11)
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Proof : see Appendix.
Now consider the optimal contract for θ > θIG. The rival knows that in this
case his project is worth funding irrespective of the value of γ. In principle, he
could either offer CMRI , described above, which leaves no informational rents to
the investor but is only accepted when γ = γB, or he could offer a contract that
induces the investor to finance the project in both states. This second contract,
denoted by CMG = {Y GHI , Y GHR , Y GLI , Y GLR }, solves the following problem, P3:
Max UP = pGWG + (1− pG)WB (4.12)
where WJ = (
θ
γJ
)(Y GHR − Y GLR ) + Y GLR ; J = G,B (4.13)
(
θ
γG
)(Y GHI − Y GLI ) + Y GLI > Z (IRG) (4.14)
(
θ
γB
)(Y GHI − Y GLI ) + Y GLI > Z (IRB) (4.15)
Y GHI + Y
GH
R = Y
H (4.16)
Y GLI + Y
GL
R = Y
L (4.17)
Y GHI > 0, Y GHR > 0, Y GLI > 0, Y GLR > 0 (LL) (4.18)
where (IRG) and (IRB) are the investor’s participation constraints, one for each
state (realization of γ). The entrepreneur’s beliefs about γ are given by his per-
ceived probability that γ = γG, denoted by pG. Clearly only one participation
constraint binds, (IRG). The following result describes the solution to P3 and the
circumstances in which the entrepreneur will choose contract CMG or contract
CMRI .
Proposition 2. Assume θ > θIG. Denote by pG the rival’s perceived prob-
ability that γ = γG. Then: there is a threshold value p∗G such that at t = 1
(i) for pG > p∗G, the rival offers contract CMG to the investor, who accepts;
(ii) for pG < p∗G, the rival offers contract CMRI to the investor, who accepts iff
γ = γB. Contract CMG has the following properties: (a) Y GLI = Y
L, Y GLR = 0;
(b) Y GHI = (γG/θ)(Z − Y L) + Y L, Y GHR = Y H − Y GHI .
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The threshold value p∗G is defined by the following condition:
p∗G{
θ
γG
(Y H − Y L) + (γG
γB
− 2)(Z − Y L)} = (γG
γB
− 1)(Z − Y L) (4.19)
Proof : see Appendix.
Thus when the rival believes that the probability of the good state is low, he
offers a contract that will induce the investor to finance his project if and only if the
state is bad. This contract has the advantage that it leaves no informational rents
to the investor. On the other hand, when the rival believes that the probability
of the good state is sufficiently high, he prefers to offer a contract that will always
induce the investor to finance his project. This contract enables the investor to
earn some informational rents when γ = γB. The following result determines the
expected value of these rents, which will prove useful below.
Corollary 1. When contract CMG is agreed between the investor and the
rival, the investor earns no informational rents if γ = γG, whereas he earns positive
informational rents when γ = γB. The magnitude of these rents, denoted by Q,
is given by:
Q = (
1
γB
− 1
γG
)γG(Z − Y L) (4.20)
We can now examine the optimal contract proposed by the incumbent at t = 0,
taking into account the possibility of entry at t = 1.
4.2.2. The incumbent’s offer
The incumbent at t = 0 can choose between three types of contract in principle:
one ensuring that the rival will not enter at t = 1 ("entry deterrence"); one that
will accommodate entry if and only if γ = γB ("partial entry deterrence"); and one
that will accommodate entry in both states ("entry accommodation"). However,
it is straightforward to verify that the optimal complete contract C1 described
earlier offers a strictly higher payoff to the incumbent than an incomplete con-
tract designed to achieve either entry deterrence or partial entry deterrence. In the
case of entry deterrence, this is due to the fact that effort incentives are provided
less efficiently than with complete contracting. Moreover, there are no offsetting
benefits associated with the entry deterrence contract (relative to C1). Partial
entry deterrence, on the other hand, entails an expected loss for the incumbent
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when entry occurs, since, unlike the investor, he receives no compensation from
the rival. Contract C1 avoids this problem because the investor is the residual
claimant; moreover, C1 elicits effort more efficiently. It therefore strictly domi-
nates the partial entry deterrence contract from the perspective of the incumbent.
Thus to see whether and when incomplete contracts might be preferred to
complete contracts, we can focus attention on the entry-accommodation contract.
Entry accommodation
Note first of all that this is only relevant for sufficiently large values of θ: if θ
is too low, the rival will not be able to obtain funding when γ = γG, because his
project cannot generate enough pledgeable income. When θ is not too low, entry
accommodation becomes feasible. The optimal contract in this case, denoted
by CME = {RHI , RHE , RLI , RLE}, is the solution to the following problem, P4:
maximize U , given by
U ≡ −1
2
e2+e[(γG−μ)RHE +(1−γG+μ)RLE]+(1−e)[(γB−μ)RHE +(1−γB+μ)RLE]
(4.21)
subject to the constraints:
e = argmax(U) (IC) (4.22)
e[γGR
H
I + (1− γG)RLI ] + (1− e)[γBRHI + (1− γB)RLI +Q] > IF (IR) (4.23)
θIG < θ and pG > p
∗
G (EA) (4.24)
RHI +R
H
E = R
H (4.25)
RLI +R
L
E = R
L (4.26)
RHI > 0, RHE > 0, RLI > 0, RLE > 0 (LL) (4.27)
In this problem, Q represents the expected value of the informational rents the
investor will earn at t = 1 if γ = γB, and was given by Corollary 1. (EA) is the
entry-accommodation constraint: it requires the rival to have sufficient pledgeable
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income to obtain funding even when γ = γG (otherwise entry accommodation is
not feasible, as noted above). Moreover, the rival’s expectations must be such
that he prefers to offer the investor contract CMG (defined by Proposition 2)
and enter, irrespective of the realization of γ, rather than offer contract CMRI
and enter only when γ = γB. The solution to P4 is described in detail in the
Appendix, and summarized by the following result.
Proposition 3 (Entry accommodation) When entry is accommodated,
second-best efficiency would require setting RHE − RLE so as to maximize the fol-
lowing expression:
W = −1
2
[∆γ(RHE −RLE)]2 + (∆γ)2(RH −RL)(RHE −RLE)− μ(RHE −RLE)
+γB(R
H −RL) + [1−∆γ(RHE −RLE)]Q+RL − IF (4.28)
Let RS denote the value of RHE −RLE that maximizesW . The optimal contract
that accommodates entry, CME, has the following properties:
(i) Suppose the following condition holds:
RL + (RH −RL −RS)[(∆γ)2RS + γB] + (1−∆γRS)Q(RS) > IF (M1) (4.29)
Then: (a) if θ > θIG and pG > p∗G, (EA) does not bind. In this case,
RHE −RLE = RS, e = ∆γRS and RLI is given by the following expression:
RLI + (R
H −RL −RS)[(∆γ)2RS + γB] + (1−∆γRS)Q(RS) = IF (4.30)
(b) otherwise, (EA) binds and determines RHE −RLE. As long as entry accom-
modation is feasible, RLE is then determined by (binding) (IR).
(ii) Suppose condition (M1) does not hold. Then: (a) if (EA) does not bind,
RHE −RLE < RS, RLI = RL and RHI is determined by (IR); (b) if (EA) does bind,
entry accommodation is not feasible.
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for this result is the following. The first best, obtained by
maximizing the project’s expected value net of effort and entry costs, and in-
clusive of the investor’s informational rents, would require setting effort equal to
eFB = ∆γ(RH − RL) − Q, and RHE − RLE as small as possible. First-best effort
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is lower than in the no-entry case because the investor now earns informational
rents in the bad state, whose probability decreases with effort. Making RHE −RLE
(i.e. the power of the entrepreneur’s incentives) as small as possible minimizes the
expected loss from entry, since only the entrepreneur loses in the event of entry,
and his loss increases with the sensitivity of his claim to final returns. At the
same time, the expected value of the investor’s informational rents is maximized
in this way, because the magnitude of the rents (i.e. Q) increases with the sen-
sitivity of the investor’s claim to final returns. In general, the first best is not
feasible because of the entrepreneur’s incentive-compatibility constraint; there is
then a trade-off between the gains from making RHE − RLE small, just described,
and the gains from making RHE − RLE large, which elicits higher effort from the
entrepreneur. This trade-off is captured by the expression forW : maximizing this
determines the second-best value for RHE − RLE, denoted by RS. As discussed in
the Appendix, second-best efficiency will entail one of two possibilities, depending
on parameter values: setting RHE −RLE small enough to maximize rent extraction
from the rival; or an interior solution with an intermediate value of RHE −RLE.
It is possible to achieve second-best efficiency if condition (M1) is satisfied and
(EA) does not bind: (M1) simply requires that the project’s maximum pledgeable
income when RHE − RLE = RS be sufficient to compensate the investor for his
capital contribution. If (EA) binds, second-best efficiency is no longer feasible;
RHE −RLE has to be increased to satisfy (EA), implying that effort will be higher,
and informational rents lower. When (M1) is not satisfied, on the other hand,
the investor has to be offered a more high-powered claim (if feasible), implying
a less high-powered claim for the entrepreneur, and hence lower effort. Clearly,
this is only possible if (EA) does not bind; otherwise, entry accommodation is not
feasible.
4.3. Complete contracts or incomplete contracts?
Denoting by e∗ the effort level implemented by the optimal incomplete contract
that accommodates entry, described by Proposition 3, we can now examine the
trade-off between complete and incomplete contracts. The incumbent’s expected
payoff from the incomplete contract described by Proposition 3, is equal to the
NPV of project F , taking into account the effect of entry, plus the expected value
of the investor’s informational rents. It is therefore given by:
24
NPV ∗ = e∗∆γ(RH −RL)− 1
2
(e∗)2+RL+ γB(R
H −RL)− IF −
μe∗
∆γ
+ (1− e∗)Q∗
(4.31)
where the last term represents the expected value of the investor’s informa-
tional rents, while the previous term represents the expected value of the incum-
bent’s loss from entry, for which he is not compensated. If the incomplete contract
implemented the same effort level as under complete contracting, i.e. e∗ = eN , we
would have:
NPV ∗ −NPV = (1− e∗)Q∗ − μe
∗
∆γ
In this case, incomplete contracts would be preferred to complete contracts
if, and only if, the expected value of the investor’s informational rents exceeded
the expected value of the incumbent’s loss from entry. This would be the case,
for example, if μ were sufficiently small. Since the optimal incomplete contract
typically implements a different effort level, there will be an additional term in
the above expression for NPV ∗ −NPV , equal to:
EC = eN∆γ(RH −RL)− 1
2
(eN)2 − [e∗∆γ(RH −RL)− 1
2
(e∗)2]
Intuition suggests that this term should be positive, reflecting the fact that
complete contracts can reward entrepreneurial effort more efficiently than incom-
plete contracts. This need not be the case, however, for the following reason: effort
under complete contracting may be reduced significantly below its first-best level
by the need to generate sufficient pledgeable income to satisfy the investor’s par-
ticipation constraint. With incomplete contracts, on the other hand, the expected
value of the investor’s informational rents becomes part of pledgeable income,
making it easier to satisfy (IR). If this effect is sufficiently important, EC may
become negative.
Taking into account the implications for effort, we see that incomplete contracts
will be chosen if, and only if, the following condition holds:
NPV ∗ −NPV = (1− e∗)Q− μe
∗
∆γ
−EC > 0
This condition clarifies and elaborates the general intuition that incomplete
contracts will be preferred when the cost of using less efficient incentive schemes
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between the principal and the agent (here, the investor and the entrepreneur) is
outweighed by the benefits of revealing less information to third parties (here,
the rival) and thereby obtaining a “better deal” from them. The efficiency cost
here is represented by the term EC, while the net expected benefit (the expected
value of informational rents, net of the cost of entry borne by the incumbent)
is represented by the first two terms. Interestingly, as noted above, it may even
be the case that EC is negative, because of the effect of informational rents on
pledgeable income. This highlights an additional potential benefit of incomplete
contracts.
4.4. Secretly-executed complete contracts?
Intuition might suggest that complete contracts with secret execution could do
better than any of the contracts considered so far, by combining the benefits of
more efficient reward schemes for entrepreneurial effort with the benefits of not
revealing information about γ to outside parties (the rival). To see this, consider
how the incumbent’s problem would be modified, when entry accommodation is
feasible, if both kinds of benefit could be combined:
Max eRe −
1
2
e2 (4.32)
e = Re (IC) (4.33)
e[γGR
H+(1−γG)RL]+(1−e)[γBRH+(1−γB)RL+Q0]−eRe > IF (IR) (4.34)
(θIG)
0 < θ and pG > (p∗G)
0 (EA) (4.35)
In this problem, as in the complete contracting case examined earlier, the in-
cumbent is rewarded if, and only if, γ = γG. The investor receives the project’s
final returns, implying that his expected loss if he funds the rival is equal to LC,
for which he is fully compensated. The difference with complete contracting is
that the rival cannot condition his offer on the realization of γ. This makes it pos-
sible for the investor to earn informational rents as in the incomplete contracting
case studied above. If (EA) does not bind, the solution to this problem gives the
incumbent a higher expected payoff than that from the corresponding complete
contract where execution is not secret (because of the presence of informational
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rents Q0), as well as a higher expected payoff than under incomplete contract-
ing (since the incumbent bears no loss from entry, his effort is rewarded more
efficiently, and Q0 > Q).
However, this outcome cannot be achieved through an ex-ante (t = 0) agree-
ment between the incumbent and the investor to keep contractual execution secret
ex post (at t = 1). Why? Suppose the incumbent and the investor sign such an
agreement. At t = 1, the contract needs to be executed: this requires establish-
ing the realized value of γ and hence determining the value of the incumbent’s
reward (Re or zero). If the reward is paid immediately, the transfer may well be
observable by outside parties. This potential difficulty could be avoided through
a deferred payment. But crucially, whether the transfer is immediate or deferred,
both contracting parties will have some hard evidence concerning their current
or deferred asset or liability, respectively23. The rival can use this to extract
information about the realized value of γ. For example, he can make his take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the investor contingent on the investor showing him evidence
that γ = γG. If this is indeed the case, the investor will possess the required hard
evidence concerning the entrepreneur’s reward. Thus the rival will essentially offer
a menu: the contract that maximizes his expected utility subject to the investor’s
participation constraint under the assumption that γ = γG, contingent on the
investor showing him hard evidence about the incumbent’s reward, and otherwise
the contract that maximizes his expected utility subject to the investor’s partici-
pation constraint under the assumption that γ = γB. Faced with this strategy by
the rival, the investor would gain nothing by withholding the hard information he
possesses when γ = γG. In such an equilibrium, the rival would indeed be able
to learn the realized value of γ and obtain funding for his project without paying
informational rents to the investor24. Thus secretly-executed contracts would not
enable the incumbent to obtain a higher expected payoff than the payoff from the
complete contract examined earlier.
23To avoid this would require the process of contractual execution itself to be deferred; i.e.
waiting until t = 2 to establish the realized value of γ and determine the value of the entrepre-
neur’s reward. However, we have assumed that the process of establishing the realized value of
γ at t = 1 depends crucially on each party’s ability to challenge any attempted manipulation
of information by the other party. As discussed in detail in the Introduction, this ability will
decrease if execution is delayed, since the relevant information concerns current circumstances
at t = 1, which will evolve over time.
24As discussed in the Introduction, the use of confidentiality clauses would not undermine this
result since breach of contract would be very difficult to prove in court.
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4.5. Renegotiation?
There are two situations where renegotiation might seem to be of interest, po-
tentially. First, suppose the incumbent and the investor choose the complete
contract (C1) at t = 0. Then if θ > θG and γ = γB at t = 1, the investor
would like the rival entrepreneur to believe that γ = γG so as to get a better
offer. This suggests the possibility of secret renegotiation between the investor
and the incumbent, along the following lines: the investor commits to paying the
entrepreneur the reward Re, as if the realized state were γ = γG, but at the same
time the incumbent commits to paying back a fraction ϕ of this reward (the frac-
tion ϕ depending on the assumptions made about the renegotiation game). The
investor could then use the hard evidence concerning the payment of the reward
Re to persuade the rival entrepreneur that indeed γ = γG. However, a similar
difficulty would arise in this context as in the case of secretly-executed contracts
discussed above. Specifically, the contracting parties would possess hard evidence
concerning the outcome of any secret renegotiation: in particular, the incumbent
would have evidence concerning his obligation to pay back the investor, implying
that in fact γ = γB. He could therefore profit by (secretly) selling this evidence
to the rival, which would destroy any possible gain the investor could obtain from
renegotiation. Thus renegotiation will not occur in this case. A similar argument
rules out secret renegotiation at t = 0 when the incumbent and the investor have
chosen the incomplete contract.
Second, suppose the incumbent and the investor choose the incomplete con-
tract at t = 0, and γ = γG at t = 1. Then the incumbent would be willing to pay
the investor to avoid entry, since he incurs a cost when the rival enters, while the
investor gains nothing25. By assumption, the incumbent has no cash with which
to pay the investor, but he can always offer the investor part of his claim to the
project’s final returns. However, this would imply additional rents for investor
1, clearly (and visibly) deviating from the cooperative agreement with other in-
vestors. The entrant would therefore obtain funding from other investors. Thus
renegotiation will not occur in this case either.
25Obviously this is not the case when γ = γB, because the investor obtains informational
rents when he funds the rival.
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5. Entry: perfectly competitive investors
We have seen that in the presence of imperfectly competitive, cooperative in-
vestors, incomplete contracts may be preferred to complete contracts because of
the strategic gains from limiting disclosure of information to potential entrants. In
this section, we study what happens when we allow for perfect competition among
investors. Do the strategic benefits of incomplete contracts disappear in this case?
To explore this question, we assume that there are two investors: investor 1, who
finances the first entrepreneur (the incumbent) at t = 0, and investor 2. Both
investors could finance the potential new entrant (rival) at t = 1. The difference
between them of course is that at t = 1 investor 1 will observe the realized value
of γ for project F , whereas investor 2, like the potential entrant, will not. The
two investors are assumed to behave competitively, implying that α = 0 (hence
IF = KF and IE = KE); thus the presence of investor 2 can be thought of as rep-
resenting more generally the consequences of perfect competition in the financial
sector. In particular, we assume that entrepreneurs have all the bargaining power
and can make credible take-it-or-leave-it offers to investors.
The timing of the game is as in previous sections, except for t = 1 when the
sequence of moves is the following:
(i) The entrant proposes a contract to investor 1. Investor 1 accepts or rejects.
If he accepts, the contract is implemented. Investor 2 does not observe the nego-
tiations between the entrant and investor 1 (in particular, he does not observe the
entrant’s offer to investor 1): he only observes the outcome, that is, the contract
if it is implemented, or the fact that no contract has been agreed between the
entrant and investor 1.
(ii) If investor 1 rejects the entrant’s offer, the latter proposes a contract to
investor 2, who accepts or rejects. If he accepts, the contract is implemented; if
he rejects, the entrant cannot undertake his project. Both projects’ returns are
realized at t = 2.
The key assumption here is that each investor cannot observe the private
negotiations between the entrant and the other investor, which seems reasonable
in this setting26.
The game is solved backward, starting with the rival’s attempt to enter at
t = 1.
26Given this assumption, it can be verified that the assumed order of the sequential offers, i.e.
first offer to investor 1, is optimal for the entrant under incomplete contracting, while it makes
no difference under complete contracting.
29
5.1. The game between the entrant and investors at t = 1
As in the imperfectly competitive case studied earlier, the entrant’s behavior will
depend on his pledgeable income, and hence on the value of θ. Specifically, behav-
ior will depend once again on whether θ is above or below each of two threshold
values, denoted by θN and θB. These values differ from the ones derived earlier
because they do not allow for the need to compensate investor 1 for his expected
loss on project F if the rival enters. They are therefore given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. There is a threshold value θN such that for all θ < θN , project E
cannot generate enough pledgeable income to compensate for the required initial
investment, KE, irrespective of the realization of γ. This threshold value is equal
to:
θN ≡
γB
Y H − Y L (IE − Y
L) (5.1)
There is also a second threshold value θB such that for all θ < θB, project E
cannot generate enough pledgeable income to compensate for the required initial
investment, KE, when γ = γG. This threshold value is equal to:
θB ≡
γG
Y H − Y L (IE − Y
L) (5.2)
Proof : follows from the proof of Lemma 1.
Unlike the corresponding threshold values for the imperfectly competitive case,
θN and θB do not depend on the form of the contract agreed between the incum-
bent and his investor: they are exogenous. The type of contract agreed at t = 0
will nevertheless influence the game between the entrant and investors at t = 1,
through its impact on the information set of the different parties. We shall there-
fore begin by studying the game induced by the optimal complete contract. This
will then be compared to the game induced by the optimal incomplete contract.
In both cases, the analysis will focus on equilibria that do not rely on ad hoc
out-of-equilibrium beliefs to sustain them, and are in this sense more robust27.
27For example, there are equilibria in which the rival and investor 1 believe that investor 2
will never be willing to fund the rival, i.e. he will refuse any contractual offer the rival might
make to him other than the null contract, even if the offer satisfies his participation constraint.
With these beliefs, it may be the case that the rival cannot induce investor 1 to finance him,
and that he then offers the null contract to investor 2, thereby failing to obtain any funding for
his project. Alternatively, the rival may make a more attractive offer to investor 1 (than the
one that would have satisfied investor 2’s participation constraint), which is accepted.
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5.1.1. Complete contracts
The optimal complete contract agreed at t = 0 between the incumbent and in-
vestor 1 will, as in the previous sections, reward the incumbent if, and only if,
γ = γG, while giving the investor the returns from project F . Execution of the
contract will then reveal the realized value of γ to all parties at t = 1. The game
that will follow between the entrant and investors can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. (Entrant’s offers to investors under complete con-
tracting) (1) Suppose θ > θB. Then for each realization of γ, the entrant offers
investor 1 the contract, denoted by CC(γ), that maximizes his (the entrant’s)
expected utility subject to the constraint that investor 1 be just compensated for
providing the required investment outlay KE. Investor 1 accepts and the project
is undertaken.
(2) Suppose θN 6 θ < θB. Then: (a) if γ = γB, the entrant behaves as in
(1): specifically, he offers investor 1 CC(γB). Investor 1 accepts and the project
is undertaken. (b) if γ = γG, the entrant cannot obtain funding for his project.
(3) If θ < θN , the rival cannot enter.
Proof : (1) the entrant’s pledgeable income would be sufficient to obtain fund-
ing from investor 2 for every realization of γ. Thus entry will occur irrespective
of investor 1’s behavior. Investor 1 will therefore accept the contractual offer that
just compensates him for providing IE.
(2) the entrant’s pledgeable income would be sufficient to obtain funding from
investor 2 if, and only if, γ = γB. For this case, the proof is as in (1). If γ = γG,
pledgeable income is too low to compensate for the required initial outlay IE, so
that neither investor will be willing to fund the project.
(3) Irrespective of the realization of γ, pledgeable income is too low to com-
pensate for the required initial outlay IE, so that neither investor will be willing
to fund the project.
¤
The key difference between this result and the corresponding one in the pres-
ence of imperfectly competitive investors is that investor 1 is not compensated for
the loss LC = μ(RH −RL) he incurs when the rival enters. The reason is that the
rival, if turned down by investor 1, could always obtain funding from investor 2, as
long as his pledgeable income is at least equal to IE. Moreover, and precisely for
this reason, there will be more entry than with imperfectly competitive investors,
in the sense that the entry thresholds will be lower; i.e. θN < θE and θB < θG.
We can now turn to the game induced by incomplete contracting.
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5.1.2. Incomplete contracts
As in the previous section, incomplete contracts will not be contingent on the
realization of γ; they will therefore take the form of a sharing rule for the project’s
returns. Let this be denoted by CCI = {RHI , RHE , RLI , RLE}, where RJM denotes,
once again, the payoff for M (M = I, E) at t = 2 when realized returns are equal
to RJ (J = H,L). I now denotes investor 1 and E the entrepreneur (incumbent).
At t = 1, in contrast with complete contracting, the game between the rival and
the investors will take place under asymmetric information; in particular, only
investor 1 will be informed about the realized value of γ.
Before we analyze the game, it will be helpful to establish some definitions and
preliminary results.
Definitions and preliminaries
Denote by CP (θ, pG) the “pooling” contract between the rival and investor 2
which would maximize the entrepreneur’s expected utility subject to the investor’s
participation constraint, given θ and uninformed beliefs pG (where pG represents
the uninformed parties’ perceived probability that γ = γG). The contract solves
the following problem:
Max U ≡ pGWRG + (1− pG)WRB (5.3)
where WKJ = (
θ
γJ
)(Y HK − Y LK ) + Y LK ; J = G,B; K = R, I (5.4)
pGW IG + (1− pG)W IB > IE (IR) (5.5)
together with the feasibility and limited liability constraints (4.5) to (4.7).
Clearly, the investor’s participation constraint (IR) can only be satisfied if project
E’s maximum pledgeable income, given the parties’ beliefs, is at least equal to
IE. In this case, (IR) will hold as an equality; investor 2 will make zero expected
profits and the entrant will obtain the project’s expected NPV. For expositional
convenience, it is useful to define the project’s maximum pledgeable income, given
θ and uninformed beliefs pG, as MPIP (θ, pG). This is given by the following
expression:
MPIP (θ, pG) = λ(Y H − Y L) + Y L (5.6)
where
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λ = θ[
pG
γG
+
(1− pG)
γB
] (5.7)
As a final preliminary, it is also helpful to define the following: let CPC(X) de-
note the contract between the rival and investor 1 that would maximize the rival’s
expected utility, subject to offering the investor an expected (gross) return equal
to IE +X, contingent on γ = γB. Thus CPC(L) corresponds to contract CMRI ,
described by Proposition 1, while CPC(0) corresponds to contract CC(γB), de-
scribed by Proposition 4. Contract CPC(X) solves a problem analogous to P2,
with γ = γB and L replaced by X: for ease of exposition, it will not be repeated
here. The solution is obtained from Proposition 1 by simply replacing L with X
(in the definition of Z). Corresponding to each value of X, there is a threshold
value of θ, call it θ(X), such that contract CPC(X) is feasible if, and only if,
θ > θ(X). It is easy to see from lemma 2 that this threshold value is equal to:
θ(X) ≡ γB
Y H − Y L (IE +X − Y
L) (5.8)
and hence increasing in X. In particular, note that θ(0) = θN and θ(L) = θIE.
The entrant’s offers to investors
We can now state the result and comment on its implications; details and the
proof are in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. (Entrant’s offers to investors under incomplete con-
tracting)
(1) Suppose θ > θB. Then: the entrant proposes contract CC(γB) to investor
1, who accepts if, and only if, γ = γB. This contract just compensates the investor
for the required outlay IE when γ = γB; it provides no compensation for the
expected loss on project F . If investor 1 rejects the offer, the entrant proposes
contract CC(γG) to investor 2, who accepts.
(2) Suppose θN 6 θ < θB. There is a threshold value θP , with θN < θP < θB,
such that for all θ below this threshold, investor 2 is not willing to accept any
offer. The game between the entrant and investor 1 is then the same as if investor
1 were a monopolist. For θ > θP , we have: (i) a pure strategy equilibrium
when θ > θIE, analogous to the corresponding one for the case of a monopoly
investor. In this equilibrium, the entrant proposes contract CMRI (described by
Proposition 1) to investor 1, who accepts if, and only if, γ = γB. Investor 2 never
accepts any offer. (ii) when θ < θIE, a pure strategy equilibrium in which the
rival chooses not to enter, and a mixed strategy equilibrium in which θ = θ(X)
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(0 < X < L). In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the entrant offers contract
CPC(X) to investor 1, who accepts with probability q (0 < q < 1) if, and only
if, γ = γB. If rejected, the entrant offers contract CP (θ, pG(q)) to investor 2,
where pG(q) ≡ pG/{pG + (1− pG)(1− q)}. Investor 2 accepts with probability p
(0 < p < 1). The entrant’s expected payoff in these mixed strategy equilibria is
equal to zero. Investor 1 expects to make a loss, while investor 2 expects to make
zero profits.
(3) If θ < θN , the entrant can never obtain funding for his project.
Proof : see Appendix.
Perfect competition among investors means that in the range θ > θB the
second entrepreneur will always be able to enter. Moreover, he will be able to do
so without leaving any rents to the investors, and without compensating investor
1 for his expected loss on project F , just as in the symmetric information case
described by Proposition 4. This is essentially because, once again, the entrant has
enough pledgeable income to be able to obtain funding from investor 2 irrespective
of the realization of γ; the fact that entry cannot be avoided (together with the
entrepreneur’s ability to make credible take-it-or-leave-it offers) prevents investor
1 from extracting any benefit from his informational advantage.
In the range θN 6 θ < θP , on the other hand, investor 1’s informational ad-
vantage means he can act effectively as a monopoly investor, since investor 2 will
never be willing to fund the entrant. The reason is that, for any feasible unin-
formed beliefs, the entrant’s pledgeable income would be too low to compensate
investor 2 for the initial outlay IE. Entry will therefore occur if, and only if, the
entrepreneur can offer enough to investor 1 to compensate him not only for his
initial investment in project E (IE), but also for his expected loss on project F :
that is, if θ > θIE and γ = γB.
In the range θP 6 θ < θB, there are two possibilities. If θ > θIE, the rival always
enters when γ = γB, since he has enough pledgeable income to obtain funding
from investor 1 with probability one. If θ < θIE, however, the rival cannot pledge
enough income to fully compensate investor 1 for his expected loss on project F ,
as well as for the required initial investment in project E. Thus a pure strategy
equilibrium with entry is not feasible. A mixed strategy equilibrium is feasible, on
the other hand, because it is possible to satisfy investor 2’s participation constraint
for sufficiently “favorable” uninformed beliefs, i.e. provided the winner’s curse is
not too strong. These equilibria are described in detail in the Appendix. A key
feature of the mixed strategy equilibria is that they yield an expected payoff equal
to zero for the entrant and investor 2, and an expected loss for investor 1. They
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are therefore Pareto dominated by the pure strategy equilibrium in which the rival
chooses not to enter, yielding an expected payoff of zero for the rival and both
investors. It seems reasonable then to select the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
5.2. The incumbent’s offer: complete contract or incomplete contract?
We can now turn our attention to the incumbent’s choice between complete and
incomplete contracts at t = 0. Clearly, an incomplete contract could only be
preferred if it induces a more “favorable” game between the entrant and investors
at t = 1. Our analysis so far shows that this will not be the case for θ sufficiently
high, or sufficiently low; we can therefore focus attention on intermediate values
of θ, in the range θN 6 θ < θB. Comparing Propositions 4 and 5, we see that
complete contracting leads to entry when γ = γB, without any compensation for
investor 1 for his expected loss on project F (and of course no compensation for
the incumbent). Incomplete contracting, on the other hand, leads either to entry
deterrence (hence no loss from entry for either investor 1 or the incumbent), or
to entry when γ = γB with full compensation for investor 1 ’s expected loss on
project F (although again no compensation for the incumbent). This advantage
has to be set against the possibly detrimental impact of incomplete contracting
on effort incentives ex ante. We now examine this potential trade-off.
5.2.1. Complete contract
With complete contracting, the incumbent will once again be induced to provide
effort through a reward contingent on the realization of γ, while investor 1 will
receive all the final returns from project F . For θN 6 θ < θB, entry will occur
if, and only if, γ = γB. The incumbent’s contractual offer to investor 1 therefore
solves the following problem, P5:
Max eRe −
1
2
e2 (5.9)
e = Re (IC) (5.10)
e[γGR
H +(1− γG)RL] + (1− e)[(γB −μ)RH +(1− γB +μ)RL]− eRe > IF (IR)
(5.11)
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It is straightforward to verify that the first-best effort level is not feasible; the
second-best effort will be determined by (IR) holding as an equality. It will
therefore be given by the largest root of the following equation:
e(∆γ + μ)(RH −RL) + (γB − μ)(RH −RL)− e2 = IF −RL (5.12)
Denote this by eC. The incumbent’s expected payoff from the complete contract,
denoted by NPV C, is then equal to:
NPV C = [eC∆γ+γB](R
H−RL)− 1
2
(eC)2+RL−IF−(1−eC)μ(RH−RL) (5.13)
5.2.2. Incomplete contract
Now consider the incumbent’s problem if he opts for an incomplete contract. For
θN 6 θ < θB, there are two possibilities in principle: entry deterrence, or partial
entry accommodation, which allows entry when γ = γB.
If entry deterrence is chosen, the optimal contract is the solution to the fol-
lowing problem, P6: maximize U , given by
U ≡ −1
2
e2 + e[γGR
H
E + (1− γG)RLE] + (1− e)[γBRHE + (1− γB)RLE] (5.14)
subject to the constraints:
e = argmax(U) (IC) (5.15)
e[γGR
H
I + (1− γG)RLI ] + (1− e)[γBRHI + (1− γB)RLI ] > IF (IR) (5.16)
θIE > θ (ED) (5.17)
together with the feasibility and limited liability constraints (4.25) to (4.27).
Here (ED) is the entry deterrence constraint, requiring that the endogeneous
threshold for entry, θIE, be higher than θ. From lemma 2, we know that this
threshold is increasing in L, the magnitude of the investor’s expected loss on
project F when he funds project E. Thus if (ED) binds, entry deterrence can only
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be achieved by giving the investor a more high-powered claim, thereby increasing
L. However, this means giving a less high-powered claim to the entrepreneur,
which reduces effort. If this is too costly, the incumbent will prefer a contract
that results in entry being accommodated when γ = γB. In this case, problem
P6 will be modified as follows. The incumbent will again maximize his expected
utility, now equal to:
−1
2
e2 + e[γGR
H
E + (1− γG)RLE] + (1− e)[(γB − μ)RHE + (1− γB + μ)RLE] (5.18)
subject to the same constraints, except for (ED), which will be replaced by
the entry accommodation constraint (EA), requiring that θIE 6 θ.
The incumbent’s optimal choice of incomplete contract is described by Propo-
sition 6. Before stating the result, it is useful to define the following. Let e1 be
the largest root of the following equation for e,
[e∆γ + γB][R
H −RL − e
∆γ
] = IF −RL (5.19)
and similarly e2 the largest root of
[e∆γ + γB][R
H −RL − e
∆γ + μ
] = IF −RL (5.20)
Define also
e0 ≡ ∆γ(RH −RL)−
∆γ
μ
[
θ(Y H − Y L)
γB
− IE + Y L] (5.21)
We can now state:
Proposition 6 (Incomplete contracts: choice between entry deter-
rence and partial entry accommodation) There is a threshold value θIE > θN
such that: (a) for θ < θIE, entry accommodation is not feasible; (b) for θ > θIE,
the incumbent will prefer entry deterrence to partial entry accommodation if,
and only if, NPV ID > NPV IE, where NPV ID = [eID∆γ + γB](RH − RL) −
1
2
(eID)2+RL− IF and NPV IE = [eIE∆γ+ γB](RH −RL)−
1
2
(eIE)2+RL− IF −
(1 − eIE)μeIE/(∆γ + μ). The effort levels eID < eIE are determined as follows.
There is a second threshold value θID > θIE, such that: (i) eID = e1 if θ < θID,
and otherwise eID = e0 −  (for  > 0 arbitrarily small); (ii) eIE = e2.
Proof : see Appendix.
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This result makes clear the trade-off in choosing between entry deterrence and
partial entry accommodation. If the induced effort levels were the same, entry
deterrence would always be chosen, since it avoids the expected loss borne by
the incumbent when entry occurs. However, effort will be higher when entry is
accommodated. The first reason for this is that entry, and hence the incumbent’s
expected loss, will occur if, and only if, γ = γB. Since effort reduces the probabil-
ity of the bad state, the return to effort is correspondingly higher with the partial
entry accommodation contract than with the entry deterrence contract. In addi-
tion, as noted above, if the entry deterrence constraint binds it will be necessary
to give the incumbent a less high-powered claim, further reducing effort. If the
effort induced by the partial entry accommodation contract is sufficiently greater,
this contract may be preferred to the entry deterrence contract.
For ease of exposition, from now on I shall simply refer to the optimal incom-
plete contract, meaning the one optimally chosen according to Proposition 6. I
shall denote its expected payoff for the incumbent asNPV I ≡ max(NPV ID, NPV IE).
5.2.3. Choosing between complete and incomplete contracts
Clearly the incumbent will prefer incomplete contracts to complete contracts if,
and only if, NPV I > NPV C. Comparing expression (5.13) with Proposition 6, it
is easy to check that this condition would always be satisfied for eC 6 eID. This
is because incomplete contracting provides more effective protection against the
losses associated with entry. However, effort will in fact be higher under complete
contracting, because incentives can be provided more efficiently in this case. Thus
incomplete contracts will be preferred if, and only if, the benefits associated with
reducing the losses from entry outweigh the costs in terms of lower effort.
What about secretly-executed complete contracts? Once again, execution
would produce hard evidence about the realization of γ at t = 1, available to
the contracting parties. It may be the case that hard evidence is only produced
when γ = γG; i.e. when a transfer has occurred, or is due to occur if payment is
delayed. This was the case considered in section 4. In this case, investor 2 could
nevertheless learn the realized value of γ by offering (secretly) to pay the incum-
bent a price P > 0 for showing him hard evidence that γ = γG. The incumbent
would have no reason to turn down a profitable side deal with investor 2, except of
course when γ = γB. Thus investor 2 could obtain information about γ from the
incumbent, and use it to make an offer to the entrant when γ = γB. The outcome
would obviously depend on what we assume about bargaining power. The point,
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though, is that the hard evidence generated by execution of the contract at t = 1
may well enable profitable side contracting, which will undermine the value, ex
ante, of secretly-executed contracts.
6. Conclusions
Rather than summarize the paper’s results, I will end with just two concluding
remarks. The first concerns the main idea of the paper, namely, that incomplete
contracts may be preferred in some circumstances because their execution reveals
less information to outside parties. This seems potentially applicable in a variety
of settings, beyond the one studied in the paper. Even in the canonical model
with a buyer and a seller, a complete contract would generally specify the quality
and quantity of the good to be traded, and the price, as a function of the state of
nature, which would include the seller’s cost and the buyer’s valuation. It may be
in the interest of the contracting parties ex ante to ensure that information about
the realized state of nature does not become easily available to outside parties ex
post.
The second remark concerns the interaction between the ex post cost of com-
plete contracts studied in this paper and the ex ante costs associated with bounded
rationality. The cognitive costs of complete contracts will presumably be greater
if the parties need to foresee not only the contingencies themselves (for possible
inclusion in the contract), but also the strategic use that may be made of the
information generated by contractual execution ex post.
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8. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let CMR = {Y HI , Y HR , Y LI , Y LR } denote the contract agreed at t = 1 between
the rival and the investor, where Y JM (M = I, R) denotes M ’s payoff at t = 2 if
project E yields returns Y J (J = H,L). Here I denotes the investor and R the
entrepreneur (rival).
Denote by PI(θ, γ) the investor’s expected income from project E at t = 2,
given contract CMR. Thus:
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PI(θ, γ) = (
θ
γ
)Y HI + (1−
θ
γ
)Y LI (8.1)
Clearly the maximum pledgeable income, denoted by MPI(θ, γ), is simply
equal to
MPI(θ, γ) = Y L +
θ
γ
(Y H − Y L) (8.2)
Let f(θ, γ) ≡MPI(θ, γ)−LC. To find the threshold value θE such that for all
θ < θE the investor will not be willing to fund project E irrespective of the value
of γ, it is sufficient to find the value of θ for which f(θ, γB) = IE. The reason is
that MPI(θ, γB) gives the highest possible income that could be pledged to the
investor to induce him to fund project E: a higher value of γ (i.e. γG) would
imply a lower pledgeable income. The threshold value θE is therefore defined by
Y L +
θE
γB
(Y H − Y L)− μ(RH −RL) = IE (8.3)
The threshold value θG, below which the income that can be pledged to the
investor would be insufficient to induce him to fund project E when γ = γG, is
similarly given by the value of θ for which f(θ, γG) = IE, defined by
Y L +
θG
γG
(Y H − Y L)− μ(RH −RL) = IE (8.4)
¤
Proof of Proposition 1
The contract CMRI = {Y HI , Y HR , Y LI , Y LR } solves the following problem:
Max US = (
θ
γB
)Y HR + (1−
θ
γB
)Y LR (8.5)
(
θ
γB
)Y HI + (1−
θ
γB
)Y LI > Z (IR) (8.6)
Y HI + Y
H
R = Y
H (8.7)
Y LI + Y
L
R = Y
L (8.8)
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Y HI > 0, Y HR > 0, Y LI > 0, Y LR > 0 (LL) (8.9)
Clearly (IR) will bind, implying that
US =
θ
γB
(Y H − Y L) + Y L − Z (8.10)
¤
Proof of Proposition 2
The contract CMG = {Y GHI , Y GHR , Y GLI , Y GLR } solves the following problem,
P3:
Max UP ≡ pGWG + (1− pG)WB (8.11)
where WJ = (
θ
γJ
)(Y GHR − Y GLR ) + Y GLR ; J = G,B (8.12)
(
θ
γG
)(Y GHI − Y GLI ) + Y GLI > Z (IRG) (8.13)
(
θ
γB
)(Y GHI − Y GLI ) + Y GLI > Z (IRB) (8.14)
Y GHI + Y
GH
R = Y
H (8.15)
Y GLI + Y
GL
R = Y
L (8.16)
Y GHI > 0, Y GHR > 0, Y GLI > 0, Y GLR > 0 (LL) (8.17)
Clearly (IRB) does not bind, while (IRG) does. Since (IRG) binds, we have:
WG =
θ
γG
[Y H−Y L−(Y GHI −Y GLI )]+Y L−Y GLI =
θ
γG
(Y H−Y L)−(Z−Y L) (8.18)
WB =
θ
γB
[Y H − Y L − (Y GHI − Y GLI )] + Y L − Y GLI (8.19)
WB −WG = (
1
γB
− 1
γG
)θ[Y H − Y L − (Y GHI − Y GLI )] (8.20)
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implying that the (rival) entrepreneur wants to set Y GHI − Y GLI as small as
possible. The optimal contract therefore sets Y GLI = Y
L, while Y GHI is determined
by (IRG) and is equal to:
Y GHI =
γG
θ
(Z − Y L) + Y L (8.21)
Using this, we obtain
WB =
θ
γB
[Y H − Y L − γG
θ
(Z − Y L)] = θ
γB
(Y H − Y L)− γG
γB
(Z − Y L) (8.22)
The entrepreneur’s expected utility from contract CMG is thus equal to:
UP = pG{ θγG
(Y H−Y L)−(Z−Y L)}+(1−pG){ θγB
(Y H−Y L)−γG
γB
(Z−Y L)} (8.23)
We can now compare the entrepreneur’s expected utility from offering contract
CMG and contract CMRI , described by Proposition 1.
The entrepreneur’s expected utility from offering contract CMRI is equal to
(1 − pG)US, since the contract will be accepted only when γ = γB. Denote by
∆U ≡ UP−(1−pG)US the difference in expected utility between offering contract
CMG and offering contract CMRI . Thus:
∆U = pG{ θγG
(Y H − Y L) + (γG
γB
− 2)(Z − Y L)}− (γG
γB
− 1)(Z − Y L) (8.24)
∂∆U
∂pG
=
θ
γG
(Y H − Y L) + (γG
γB
− 2)(Z − Y L) (8.25)
Since θ > θIG, we know that
θ > γG
Y H − Y L (Z − Y
L) (8.26)
implying that
∂∆U
∂pG
> 0 (8.27)
Moreover, when pG = 0 we have
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∆U = −(γG
γB
− 1)(Z − Y L) < 0 (8.28)
while for pG = 1 we have
∆U =
θ
γG
(Y H − Y L)− (Z − Y L) > 0 (8.29)
with the inequality holding strictly for all θ > θIG.
Thus there must be a unique value of pG, call it p∗G, such that contract CMRI
is preferred for all pG < p∗G, while contract CMG is preferred for all pG > p
∗
G.
This value is defined by the condition ∆U = 0.
¤
Proof of Proposition 3
The contract CME = {RHI , RHE , RLI , RLE} is the solution to the following prob-
lem, P4: maximize U , given by
U ≡ −1
2
e2+e[(γG−μ)RHE +(1−γG+μ)RLE]+(1−e)[(γB−μ)RHE +(1−γB+μ)RLE]
(8.30)
subject to the constraints:
e = argmax(U) (IC) (8.31)
e[γGR
H
I + (1− γG)RLI ] + (1− e)[γBRHI + (1− γB)RLI +Q] > IF (IR) (8.32)
θIG < θ and pG > p
∗
G (EA) (8.33)
RHI +R
H
E = R
H (8.34)
RLI +R
L
E = R
L (8.35)
RHI > 0, RHE > 0, RLI > 0, RLE > 0 (LL) (8.36)
The first best here would entail choosing e and RHE −RLE to maximize:
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e∆γ(RH −RL)− 1
2
e2+RL+γB(R
H −RL)−μ(RHE −RLE)+ (1− e)Q− IF (8.37)
which implies setting e = ∆γ(RH −RL)−Q and RHE −RLE as low as possible.
Given the assumptions made so far, the lower bound on RHE −RLE would be given
by setting RHE = 0 and R
L
E = R
L. However, this would mean that the incumbent
has a strictly higher expected payoff in the bad state. In practice, this could easily
generate perverse incentives; for example, if there are actions that the incumbent
could choose that increase the probability of the bad state - a kind of negative
effort. Since we have assumed effort to be non-negative, we will focus attention on
the case where RHE −RLE > 0. In general, e = ∆γ(RH−RL)−Q and RHE −RLE = 0
is not consistent with the incumbent’s incentive-compatibility constraint, given
by:
e = ∆γ(RHE −RLE) (IC) (8.38)
Thus the first best is not feasible28. The second best would entail choosing
RHE − RLE to maximize the project’s NPV, taking into account (IC); i.e., maxi-
mizing the following expression:
W = −1
2
[∆γ(RHE −RLE)]2 + (∆γ)2(RH −RL)(RHE −RLE)− μ(RHE −RLE)
+γB(R
H −RL) + [1−∆γ(RHE −RLE)]Q+RL − IF (8.39)
Differentiating W gives:
φ ≡ ∂W
∂(RHE −RLE)
= −(∆γ)2(RHE −RLE) + (∆γ)2(RH −RL)− μ
−∆γQ+ [1−∆γ(RHE −RLE)]
dQ
d(RHE −RLE)
(8.40)
28Specifically, it is only feasible in the very special case where the following condition is
satisfied:
(RH −RL)(1− μ
γB
) =
1
γB
[IE − Y L]
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where
dQ
d(RHE −RLE)
= −μ( 1
γB
− 1
γG
)γG = −μ(
∆γ
γB
) (8.41)
We are interested in the range 0 6 RHE − RLE 6 RMAX ≡ max[0, RH − RL −
(IE − Y L)/(γB − μ)].29
Evaluating expression (8.40) whenRHE−RLE = 0 and whenRHE−RLE = RMAX =
RH −RL − (IE − Y L)/(γB − μ) yields:
φ(0) =
1
γB
{(∆γ)2[(RH −RL)(γB − μ)− (IE − Y L)]− μγG}
φ(RMAX) =
(∆γ)2μ
γB
[RH −RL − (IE − Y
L
γB − μ
)]− μγG
γB
<
∆γμ
γB
− μγG
γB
< 0
The second derivative is given by:
∂2W
∂(RHE −RLE)2
= −(∆γ)2 − 2∆γ dQ
d(RHE −RLE)
= (∆γ)2[
2μ
γB
− 1] (8.42)
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1 : 2μ < γB. Thus φ is decreasing. There are two possibilities, depending
on parameter values: (i) if φ(0) > 0, there is an interior solution; (ii) if φ(0) 6 0,
there is a corner solution at RHE −RLE = 0.
Case 2 : 2μ > γB. Thus φ is non-decreasing. The only possibility is a corner
solution at RHE −RLE = 0.
Denote then by RS the solution. To see whether the second best is feasible,
we need to check whether (IR) and (EA) are satisfied.
(i) Suppose the following condition holds:
RL + (RH −RL −RS)[(∆γ)2RS + γB] + (1−∆γRS)Q(RS) > IF (M1) (8.43)
where Q(RS) is given by
Q(RS) =
∆γ
γB
[IE − Y L + μ(RH −RL −RS)]
29The upper bound is obtained by requiring that effort never exceed ∆γ(RH −RL)−Q.
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Then it is possible to set RHE − RLE = RS and to satisfy (IR). There are two
possibilities: (a) if θ > θIG and pG > p∗G, (EA) does not bind. In this case,
RHE −RLE = RS, e = ∆γRS and RLI is given by the following expression:
RLI + (R
H −RL −RS)[(∆γ)2RS + γB] + (1−∆γRS)Q(RS) = IF (8.44)
(b) otherwise, (EA) binds and determines RHE −RLE. As long as entry accom-
modation is feasible, RLE is then determined by (binding) (IR).
(ii) Suppose condition (M1) does not hold. It is not possible to set RHE −RLE =
RS and to satisfy (IR): even if we set RLE as low as possible (i.e. RLE = 0), setting
RHE −RLE = RS (i.e. RHE = RS) does not yield enough pledgeable income for the
investor. It is therefore necessary to increaseRHI in order to satisfy (IR) (note that
this also increases Q). Then: (a) if (EA) does not bind, RHE −RLE < RS, RLI = RL
and RHI is determined by (IR); (b) if (EA) does bind, entry accommodation is
not feasible, since satisfying (EA) would require reducing RHI −RLI , which would
violate (IR)30.
¤
Proof of Proposition 5
(1) Suppose θ > θB. In this case, the rival’s pledgeable income would be suf-
ficient to obtain funding from investor 2 for every realization of γ. In particular,
contract CC(γG) would be feasible and would always satisfy investor 2’s partic-
ipation constraint. The following strategies therefore represent an equilibrium:
the rival offers contract CC(γB) to investor 1. Investor 1 accepts if, and only if,
γ = γB. If investor 1 rejects the offer, the entrepreneur proposes contract CC(γG)
to investor 2, who accepts. Investor 1 has no incentive to deviate: given that the
rival will be able to enter even if investor 1 rejects his offer, investor 1 cannot
avoid losing L by rejecting the rival’s offer. He will therefore accept the rival’s
offer as long as his expected return on project E is at least equal to the required
investment outlay IE. When the rival offers contract CC(γB), this condition will
be satisfied if, and only if, γ = γB. Investor 2 has no incentive to deviate either,
since CC(γG) satisfies his participation constraint (in equilibrium, he expects to
make zero profits from this contract). Finally, the rival has no incentive to devi-
ate, since in equilibrium he always succeeds in obtaining funding for his project,
without leaving any rents to the investors.
(2) Suppose θN 6 θ < θB. Let the threshold value θP be defined by the
condition
30It is straightforward to verify that θIG and p∗G are both decreasing in R
H
E −RLE .
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MPIP (θP , pG) = IE (8.45)
implying that for 0 < pG < 1,31 θN < θP < θB. Then:
(i) assume that θ < θP . In this case, suppose that the rival does not have
the opportunity to make an offer to investor 1, so that his interaction with in-
vestor 2 occurs on the basis of common uninformed beliefs pG, and this is common
knowledge to both parties. Investor 2 will never be willing to fund the rival, be-
cause his pledgeable income is too low to compensate the investor for the required
investment outlay IE. Allowing for the rival’s prior interaction with investor 1
can only reinforce this result, since the probability that γ = γG, conditional on
the rival reaching the stage of making an offer to investor 2, may be higher but
will never be lower than pG. We can conclude that in equilibrium investor 2 will
never fund the rival. Thus the game between the rival and investor 1 will be the
same as if investor 1 were a monopolist. Specifically, for θ < θIE (where θ
I
E was
defined by Lemma 2), the rival will not be able to obtain funding from investor
1, and will therefore be unable to enter. For θ > θIE, the rival will offer investor 1
contract CMRI , described by Proposition 1; the investor will accept if, and only
if, γ = γB.
(ii) assume that θ > θP . In this case, if θ > θIE, the pure strategy equilibrium
in which the rival offers investor 1 contract CMRI , described by Proposition 1,
and the investor accepts if, and only if, γ = γB, while investor 2 never funds the
rival (as in (i)), is still feasible. It is the only feasible pure strategy equilibrium,
since if the rival could offer a contract that always induced investor 2 to fund him
in equilibrium, he would first offer CC(γB) to investor 1, as in (1) above, implying
that he would only reach the stage of making an offer to investor 2 if γ = γG. But
then investor 2 could only expect to make a loss by funding the rival, so this could
not be an equilibrium. If θ < θIE, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which
the rival obtains funding (when γ = γB), since he cannot pledge enough income
to fully compensate investor 1 for his expected loss on project F , as well as for
the required initial investment in project E. Thus if investor 1 believes investor 2
will never finance the rival, he will deny funding.
Suppose now that for θ > θ(X) and 0 < X < L, there is a mixed strategy
equilibrium, in which the rival offers CPC(X) to investor 1, who accepts with
probability q (0 < q < 1) if, and only if, γ = γB. If rejected, the rival then offers
31This condition will always hold in equilibrium, since in equilibrium we must have pG = e1 6
eH < 1, and by assumption (A1) we must have strictly positive effort, hence pG = e1 > 0.
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the “pooling” contract CP (θ, pG(q)) to investor 2, where pG(q) ≡ pG/{pG + (1−
pG)(1− q)}. Investor 2 accepts with probability p (0 < p < 1). For this to be an
equilibrium, investor 1 should have no incentive to deviate. Thus we require that,
conditional on γ = γB, his expected loss from entry if he accepts the rival’s offer,
equal to L−X, be equal to his expected loss if he rejects the offer, equal to pL.
This condition determines the probability p as follows:
p =
L−X
L
(8.46)
It will then be the case that when γ = γG, the investor’s expected loss from
accepting the rival’s offer will be strictly greater, while his expected loss from
rejecting the offer will be the same, implying that rejection is his best response,
as required.
Investor 2 will have no incentive to deviate, since his expected payoff from
accepting contract CP (θ, pG(q)) is the same as his expected payoff from rejecting
it (equal to zero). In equilibrium it must also be the case that the the entrepreneur
could not gain by offering investor 2 a slightly different contract, which gives the
investor a strictly positive albeit very small expected payoff (given beliefs pG(q)),
and thereby induces him to accept with probability one. This yields the following
condition, which determines q:
MPIP (θ, pG(q)) = IE (8.47)
Thus the entrepreneur’s expected payoff when investor 2 accepts his offer is
equal to zero in equilibrium. The same argument can therefore be applied to the
entrepreneur’s interaction with investor 1, implying the following further condi-
tion, which determines X:
MPI(θ, γB) = IE +X (8.48)
Thus the entrepreneur’s expected payoff when investor 1 accepts his offer must
also be equal to zero. Note that the last condition is equivalent to the condition
θ = θ(X), implying that there is one and only one of the mixed strategy equilibria
just described for each value of θ in the range θP 6 θ < θIE. It also follows that
there are no such mixed strategy equilibria for θ > θIE.
We have established that these mixed strategy equilibria would yield an ex-
pected payoff equal to zero for the entrant and investor 2, and an expected loss
for investor 1, equal to L − X = pL. So far we have assumed, by convention,
that when his expected payoffs from entry and no entry are the same, the rival
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will choose to enter. In this case, however, it seems reasonable to consider also
the equilibrium in which the rival chooses not to enter (e.g. he offers the null
contract). This equilibrium yields an expected payoff equal to zero for the rival
and for both investors; it therefore Pareto dominates the mixed strategy equilibria
just described.32
(3) If θ < θN , the entrepreneur’s pledgeable income is insufficient to compen-
sate for the cost of the required investment IE, irrespective of the realization of
γ. Thus neither investor will be willing to fund his project.
¤
Proof of Proposition 6
Problem P6 entails maximizing
U ≡ −1
2
e2 + e[γGR
H
E + (1− γG)RLE] + (1− e)[γBRHE + (1− γB)RLE] (8.49)
subject to the constraints:
e = ∆γ(RHE −RLE) (IC) (8.50)
e[γGR
H
I + (1− γG)RLI ] + (1− e)[γBRHI + (1− γB)RLI ] > IF (IR) (8.51)
θIE > θ (ED) (8.52)
RHI +R
H
E = R
H (8.53)
RLI +R
L
E = R
L (8.54)
RHI > 0, RHE > 0, RLI > 0, RLE > 0 (LL) (8.55)
Implementing the first-best effort level e = ∆γ(RH −RL) would violate (IR);
thus effort will be below its first-best level. There are two possibilities: if (ED)
32For θ = θP , there are also mixed strategy equilibria with q = 0, X determined by (8.48),
and p satisfying pL 6 L−X. These equilibria also have the property that the expected payoff
for the rival and investor 2 are equal to zero, while investor 1’s expected payoff is negative (zero
for p = 0).
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does not bind, maximizing second-best effort requires setting RLE = 0 (RLI = RL)
(from (IC)). RHI is then determined by (IR) holding as an equality. If (ED)
does bind, it determines RHI − RLI (using lemma 2). RLI is then determined by
(IR) holding as an equality. Denote by eID the corresponding effort level. Thus,
letting e1 be the largest root of the following equation for e,
[e∆γ + γB][R
H −RL − e
∆γ
] = IF −RL (8.56)
and defining
e0 ≡ ∆γ(RH −RL)−
∆γ
μ
[
θ(Y H − Y L)
γB
− IE + Y L] (8.57)
RID ≡ RH − e1
∆γ
(8.58)
θID ≡ γB
Y H − Y L [IE + μ(R
ID −RL)− Y L] (8.59)
we have: eID = e1 if θ < θID, and otherwise eID = e0−  (for  > 0 arbitrarily
small).
If the incumbent chooses instead to accommodate entry when γ = γB, problem
P6 is modified as follows: expected utility is now equal to
−1
2
e2 + e[γGR
H
E + (1− γG)RLE] + (1− e)[(γB − μ)RHE + (1− γB + μ)RLE] (8.60)
implying that the incentive constraint becomes
e = (∆γ + μ)(RHE −RLE) (IC) (8.61)
while (ED) is replaced by the entry-accommodation constraint (EA):
θIE 6 θ (EA) (8.62)
First-best effort is correspondingly higher, and is given by e = ∆γ(RH−RL)+
μ(RHE −RLE). Again, this will not be feasible, and the solution will entail setting
RLE = 0, with R
H
I determined by (IR) holding as an equality
33. Denote by eIE
33Note that if this solution does not satisfy (EA), entry accommodation is not possible, since
relaxing the (EA) constraint would require giving a more high-powered claim to the entrepre-
neur, which would violate (IR).
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the corresponding effort level. Define the following: e2 is the largest root of the
equation
[e∆γ + γB][R
H −RL − e
∆γ + μ
] = IF −RL (8.63)
RIE ≡ RH − e2
∆γ + μ
(8.64)
θIE ≡ γB
Y H − Y L [IE + μ(R
IE −RL)− Y L] (8.65)
Then: eIE = e2 if θ > θIE; otherwise entry accommodation is not feasible.
Clearly e2 > e1, eIE > eID and θIE < θID.
¤
54
